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Slurs and Meaning 
ABSTRACT: This essay examines the semantics-pragmatics divide in some recent articles about slurs. 
The semantic accounts suggesting a hybrid semantic meaning as well as the accounts that wish to 
include the notion of linguistic competence in semantic meaning are examined and found to have 
trouble finding a theoretically elegant explanation of the meaning of slurs. The deflationary pragmatic 
accounts examined are, in contrast, found to not have enough explanatory power to fully account for 
some of what are generally thought to be slurs’ primary functions in language. Therefore, the essay 
concludes on the note that perhaps none of these recent accounts examined are to prefer above the 
other in explaining the meaning of slurs, and that it might be suggested that an account of slurs that 
utilize pragmatics to describe many of the elements of slurs outlined in semantic accounts may fare 






In the recent debate about slurs, opposing camps have formed where the debaters 
generally conform to either semantic or pragmatic accounts of slurs. What they 
disagree on is whether it is the slur’s semantic or pragmatic meaning that causes the 
offensive and/or insulting effects that occur when a slur is uttered. Classically, the 
distinction between semantic and pragmatic meaning isolate semantic meaning as the 
truth-conditional content of a word, whereas pragmatic meaning includes meanings 
interpreted from the word’s use in context. The phrase “the cat is on the mat” is true 
iff the cat is on the mat. This is the phrase’s truth-conditional, semantic meaning. The 
same phrase could be used to tell your roommate that their muddy pet is leaving stains 
on your pristine white rug. That would then belong to the phrase’s pragmatic meaning.  
Generally, the proponents of a semantic point of view of slurs propose an 
inflation of what the concept of semantic meaning should include, arguing for the 
addition of extra elements to the classic notion of semantic truth-conditional meaning. 
Those who support a pragmatic account of slurs’ offensive and/or harmful effects 
deny that any aspect of these effects derives from semantic meaning. Pragmatic 
accounts generally conform to the classic distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics, and argue that elements of their use rather than components of their 
semantic meaning solely causes slurs’ offensiveness. Although those who support a 
semantic point of view agree that part of, or most, of the offense or hurt caused by 
slurs actually derives from the use of the slur, they do not agree that slurs are 
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offensive exclusively because of pragmatic factors. Semantic accounts argue that 
pragmatics is not sufficient to account for slurs’ offensive or hurtful effects. 
In this essay I aim to review some of the recent contributions to the debate 
about slurs. I shall argue that the semantic accounts I look at seem to take more 
seriously the offensive and harmful effects of slurs in comparison to the pragmatic 
accounts. Conversely, the pragmatic accounts I review seem to do the opposite. After 
presenting these accounts on slur meaning, I will discuss the problems that they face, 
and suggest that maybe a re-valuing of semantic and pragmatic meaning might be 
able to avoid these. 
Do note that I will write out some slurs in the essay that follows, knowing that 
even the mention of a slur is sometimes enough to cause insult or offense, as I believe 
that neglecting to present examples of the kind of words that are subject of this essay 
would be doing the seriousness of the topic a disservice. Naturally, when they do 
occur in this essay, it will be so only in mention and not in use. 
 
1.2 Defining ‘slur’ 
To begin the task set in this essay, we first need to get a sense of what a slur is. As 
evident from the semantic-pragmatic briefly outlined conflict above, this might 
provide an issue, since it is a dispute about slurs’ meaning that is at the root of the 
issue. Is a slur offensive in and of itself, or is it a word that causes offense because of 
the ways it is used? In an attempt to at least clarify the role slurs play in language, I 
aim to first describe what most agree that slurs do (either when used or as 
automatically performed speech acts given their semantic meaning). I will then go on 
to discuss some things that slurs are not. By that point I aim to have clarified the 
concept of slurs enough for the reader to have a sense of what a slur is before delving 
in to the different accounts of the meaning of slurs.  
Firstly, there is a general consensus that slurs are considered insulting and/or 
offensive when uttered in most contexts.1 Not to all, I am sure, but for most they are 
words of the kind that are best left unspoken in polite company. And when at the re-
ceiving end of a slur or if we are in the group of people it targets, it is often perceived 
                                                
1 Of the articles I refer to in this essay, the one account that might be thought of as disagreeing with this 
point is found in Geoffrey Nunberg’s ”The Social Life of Slurs”, New Work on Speech Acts, ed. Daniel 
Fogal, Daniel W. Harris and Matt Moss, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 237-294. 
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that the speaker somehow has committed an act of valuing the target group poorly, as 
somehow lesser or other than other humans. What exactly it is that causes a slur to 
have this effect is not agreed upon, causing the divide between semantic and 
pragmatic theories that shall be reviewed in the following sections. For now, I note 
that it is simply so that slurs are considered to have offensive effects, though accounts 
vary as to why and how.  
By slurs’ offensive effects I mean the fact that they in most situations can cause 
hearers to feel offended, insulted, poorly valued, or hurt. Again, there is not much 
agreement within philosophy of language as to how and why these effects come to be. 
I therefore aim use the very vague notion of ‘slurs’ offensiveness’ as a form of 
shorthand to include all and any of these effects, so as they are agreed upon to exist 
by most parties in the debate. 
Secondly, there is a general consensus in the debate that slurs are words that 
single out a group of humans (or one person as part of a group) based upon some 
shared characteristic or defining trait. These may include gender, race, sexuality, 
ethnicity and similar factors.2 It can also have to do with country of origin, one of the 
more frequent examples being ‘chink’ for people of Chinese origin. Most of the 
articles I shall bring attention to also agree that slur words have insulting, derogating, 
distancing, or devaluing effects when used to describe another person. There is a 
sense in which the slur is seen as an imposing an undeserved or unjust description 
upon their targets.3  
However not all agree that derogatory words that apply particularly to women 
or that denote feminine characteristics are in fact to be counted as slurs, examples of 
these are ‘slut’, ‘bitch’, ‘pussy’, ‘witch’, and similar terms.4 This because some 
consider derogative words that signal femininity or that the target is female to not be 
derogative to the set of all female or feminine persons.5 I, however, do not see how 
this conclusion is drawn, as they, to me, signal a devaluing of femaleness or 
                                                
2 Some disagreement exists on the grounds of what kind of social groups that can be included in the set 
of slurs, see for example Justina Diaz-Legaspe’s “What is a slur?”, Philosophical Studies, 2019-02-18, 
https://doi-org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/10.1007/s11098-019-01259-3, accessed 2020-01-14, p. 2. 
3 Kent Bach, “Loaded Words. On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Slurs”, Bad Words. Philosophical 
Perspectives on Slurs, ed. David Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 72. 
4 Kent Bach, for example, seems to consider slurs against women to be “personal” and “character”-
related, used for people who are “worse than annoying”. Bach, p. 75.  
5 Diaz-Legaspe in her article points out that many accounts of slurs are unsatisfactory in that they do 
not include gendered slurs, which I too have found to be the case across almost all accounts of slurs 
studied for this essay. Diaz-Legaspe, p. 12. 
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femininity much in the same way as a racial slur devalues on the basis of racial 
factors. If Steven or Lisa are bad at playing sports and is therefore being called ‘pussy’ 
by their peers, this is an example of where a word denoting female or feminine 
defining characteristics is used to imply that a person having these traits is somehow 
lesser valued than those that do not. To me, the use of such words is therefore clearly 
offensive to all women and feminine persons, as the idea of feminine or female 
defining traits is being used to imply or explain a person’s perceived shortcomings. 
This might seem like a digression, but I find that it singles out an important aspect of 
why slurs are commonly thought to be offensive: they seem to be able to be 
derogative not only towards the person it is aimed at, but also toward the whole group 
of individuals it denotes.6 
 Furthermore, it is commonly argued that there to most slurs seems to exist what 
is called a ‘neutral counterpart’, that is to say, a word that denotes the same group of 
people but which will not garner negative attention when uttered, as it is considered 
commonplace and neutral as opposed to derogative.7 In Swedish, an example of a 
slur/neutral counterpart pairing would be ‘Lapp’ as opposed to the more neutral 
‘Same’ to denote a person of the Sámi population.  
 What is also commonly agreed upon is that a slur does not always have the 
same effect when spoken: the prime example being that in some predominantly 
African American communities where ‘nigga’ can be successfully used if not 
affectionally, then neutrally.8 This last point exemplifies an issue within the debate 
about slurs that we shall return to it later as it poses a problem for some of the 
semantic accounts. For now, we shall be content with the fact that most agree that it 
matters not only that a slur is spoken, but also who it is that utters it, and that slurs in 
some situations may be uttered without any offensive effects.   
Moreover, slurs are also fairly commonly said to reflect upon the speaker’s 
person, which in turn may lead the hearer to draw conclusions about the speaker. An 
interesting and somewhat related characteristic that Elisabeth Camp and Kent Bach 
                                                
6 A similar reasoning is found in Robin Jeshion’s, ”Slurs, Dehumanization, and the Expression of 
Contempt”, Bad Words. Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, ed. David Sosa, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018, pp. 77-107. 
7 At this point in the essay, I suspend judgement on whether or not it is the slur itself or the use of a slur 
that is derogative. 
8 This issue is expanded upon in Luvell Anderson’s ”Calling, Addressing, and Appropriation”, Bad 
Words. Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, ed. David Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 
pp. 6-28. 
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draw attention to is that slurs also seem to ‘project’ their offensiveness through 
reported speech.9 Compare the following utterances:  
 
1: “Anna said that she hates kikes.” 
2: “Anna said that she hates Jews.” 
 
In this example, it seems that while uttering (1) is offensive, the same cannot be said 
of if someone utters (2). There does seem to be, as Camp notes, some element of 
offense to be derived from the very fact that the speaker chooses to use the slur in 
their report of another’s utterance, rather than a neutral alternative.10 In this way, there 
seems to be a unique quality of slurs in that they remain offensive in reported speech. 
Now that I’ve introduced some things that most agree that slurs do or at least 
cause, I wish to bring up some things that slurs, in my mind, do not do, and that they 
are not. Kent Bach, for example, draws a distinction between personal slurs and group 
slurs, where he considers words as diverse as “asshole”, “lame ass”, and “couch 
potato”, to be “personal” slurs.11 I, however, do not agree that his concept of personal 
slurs actually do belong to the group of slurs, as a common opinion is that slurs 
generally bring about some form of undeserving negative attention upon its targets, 
which is not the case in all instances of someone being called ‘asshole’. As Bach 
himself says, there is nothing that “makes a Jew a kike”.12 But calling a Jewish person 
‘kike’ might in the eyes of many qualify the speaker as deserving of the epithet 
‘asshole’.  
Moreover, returning to the reasoning around slurs about women and femininity, 
it seems that considering these kinds of insults to be slurs amounts to a dilution of the 
concept. The words Bach call personal slurs do not import undeserved negative 
attention on anyone else than the one the word is directed at. True, such name-calling 
may be undeserved, but it does not reflect or purport a negative view of a group of 
humans, which as seen above could be considered to be an important characteristic of 
slurs. In my view, slurs are thus quite distinct from personal insults in that they have a 
                                                
9 Elizabeth Camp ”A Dual Act Analysis of Slurs”, Bad Words. Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, ed. 
David Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 36f; Bach p. 68. 
10 Ibid., p. 41-42.  
11 Bach, p. 61, 69, 75; Additionally, some words Bach names as personal slurs, such as “dyke” and 
“fag”, are rather group slurs, in that their use is derogative to a whole group of persons rather than 
single targets. 
12 Ibid., p. 72. 
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quality of undeservedness about them, and are often derogative to the whole group of 
individuals it denotes rather than just a single target. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that although slurs in their offensiveness may 
seem related to expletives such as ‘fuck’, their inappropriateness is where the 
similarities end. According to Adam M. Croom, drawing from concepts outlined by 
Christopher Potts, swear words and the like fall in the family of expressives: words 
that serve only to express the state of mind or emotion of the speaker whereas slurs 
also communicate a contempt for the group of people that the target belongs to.13 
While some semantic accounts argue that slurs have components of meaning that 
make use of a similar kind of expressive element, most would have it that slurs are not 
‘simply’ expressives, as that would not be enough to account for slurs’ offensiveness. 
In this section I have presented slurs as words that:  
1. Cause offense and hurt when used. 
2. Denote a certain group of humans. 
3. Are derogating, hurtful, and unwarranted. 
4. When aimed at a single target, is still derogative to the whole group it denotes. 
5. Often have so-called neutral counterparts. 
6. May not always be offensive, depending on who the speaker is. 
7. Have an ability to project their offensive effects through reported speech. 
8. Reflect upon the speaker’s person. 
9. Are not the same as regular insults directed at single targets. 
10. Are not the same as expletives. 
Even though on most points there are dissenters in the debate, there are to my 
knowledge no accounts that simultaneously deny all of them. Having established this 
list of slurs’ general characteristics, we can move on to investigate how the semantic 
and pragmatic accounts differ in respect to which points they find to be most 
important in what slurs are and can do.  
 
 
2. Semantic accounts of slurs 
 
In this section I will present a selection of what I find to be the most interesting recent 
semantic accounts of slurs. What unites this kind of accounts is the view that the 
definition of semantic meaning as truth-conditional is not enough to describe slurs’ 
                                                
13 Adam M. Croom ”How to do things with slurs: Studies in the way of derogatory words”, Language 
and Communication (2013:33), p. 178f. 
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linguistic function and effects. I shall begin by addressing the kind of semantic 
accounts that postulate additional contents of semantic meaning outside the truth-
conditional element of slurs’ meaning. After that I will follow with the kind of 
semantic account that wishes to expand the notion of semantic meaning to include a 
notion of linguistic competence necessary for comprehension. The kinds of semantic 
accounts of slurs mentioned here are not, with respect to space limitations, 
representative of all kinds of semantic accounts of slurs’ meaning, but those that I find 
to best capture the characteristics of slurs listed in the previous section.14 
To begin, I wish to give some of the reasons presented for arguing an expan-
sion of truth-conditional semantics given by its proponents. One argument that Camp 
brings up, in turn borrowed from Bach, is that reports of speech that replace a slur 
with a neutral counterpart inaccurately represent the utterance it is reporting, as in 
Camp’s example: 
 
3: “Institutions that treat Chinese as chinks are racist.” 
 
Versus in reported speech:  
 
3R: “Institutions that treat Chinese as Chinese are racist.” 
 
Thus, Camp argues, there is an element of a slur’s meaning that is undeniably not 
present in its neutral counterpart.15 Furthermore, Camp argues that any theory that 
treats a slur as truth-conditionally equivalent to its neutral counterpart cannot make 
sense of sentences like:  
 




5: “ Jews are kikes.” 
 
                                                
14 One article I have excluded is Christopher Hom and Robert May’s account of slurs as fictional or 
extensionless, see Hom, Christopher, & May, Robert, “Pejoratives as Fiction”, Bad Words: 
Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, ed. David Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 108-
131. This since I believe that it does not capture the extensional function of slurs, and as I do not share 
their view of fictionality and its function in language, which is far beyond the scope of this essay. 
15 Camp, p. 43. 
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Since (4) would then be contradictory despite making perfect sense, and (5) would be 
logically true, going against the commonly held view that ‘kike’ does not represent 
the exact same thing as ‘Jew’ does.16 These examples from Camp highlight some of 
the issues with slurs that cause many to claim that there is a need for semantic 
accounts of slurs’ offensive effects rather than a pragmatic one, due to there seeming 
to be something inescapably different in the meaning of a slur compared to other 
words that share the same extension. 
 
2.1 Hybrid accounts 
Of the more popular among the kind of theories postulating additional components to 
a slurs’ semantic meaning are the ‘hybrid expressivist’ accounts. In general, these 
accounts divides slur’s semantic meaning into two parts: one that designates group 
membership and that is equivalent to the word’s neutral counterpart (filling the 
function of truth-conditional group-designating meaning), as well as another, 
expressive, part of additional semantic content that expresses the speaker’s negative 
disposition toward the target group identified by the slur.17 Hence the name hybrid 
expressivism. In this section I will review two accounts that are broadly hybrid 
expressivist, Jeshion’s and Camp’s, and one put forward by Bach that is based upon 
hybrid expressivism. Therefore I have chosen to group these as hybrid accounts since 
they are not altogether purely hybrid expressivist. What unites these accounts is that 
they argue for hybrid views of slurs’ semantic meaning, where one part is truth-
conditional and another element of semantic meaning that sets the slur apart from its 
neutral counterpart. I will use this section to give a brief overview of these accounts, 
and go over some of the problems they face in the next. 
Robin Jeshion offers a variety of hybrid expressivism with the modification that 
she postulates yet another part of semantic content, which expresses the speaker’s 
idea that the group designation expressed by the slur is the most important constituent 
of the slur target’s identity, their most fundamental characteristic. In this way, Jeshion 
argues that one of the ways that slurs are derogative is that they reduce the target to a 
single identifying characteristic.18 
                                                
16 Camp, p. 43. 
17 Jeshion, p. 78. 
18 Ibid., p. 78-79. 
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Elisabeth Camp’s “dual act”-theory also falls under the hybrid expressivist 
umbrella.19 In her account there is the neutral counterpart-corresponding part of the 
slur as well as a second part that expresses that the speaker has certain perspectives 
(negative stereotype-based sets of propositions that are not necessarily precisely 
defined) about the slur’s target.20 Camp argues that the additional expressive element 
of meaning present in slurs “may affect truth-value” of utterances in comparison to 
utterances that instead contain a neutral counterpart.21 What separates Camp from 
other hybrid expressivists is that she proposes both elements to be equally important 
to a slur’s truth-conditional meaning, but being primary or secondary according to 
context of utterance.22 
Another variety of hybrid account is Kent Bach’s “loaded descriptivism”.23 On 
Bach’s account part of the slur’s meaning corresponds to what is denoted by the slur’s 
neutral counterpart, and one additional descriptive component, that could be 
summarised along the lines of: 
 
SLUR (Bach): x is a [group Y] and x is therefore worthy of contempt. 
 
Thereby, the second part of slurs’ semantic meaning is descriptive rather than ex-
pressive of a speaker’s view of the extensional target(/s) of the slur.24 Bach thus 
rejects the ‘expressivism’ part of hybrid expressivism, but retains the idea of slurs 
having a hybrid semantic meaning in his descriptivist account. 
 
2.2 Problems for hybrid accounts of slurs 
Having given an overview of how these accounts are constructed, I shall present some 
issues that these theories of slur meaning face due to being of the hybrid semantic 
variety. I have chosen to combine the criticism of them into one collective section 
rather than point out the same issues that each of them face individually. 
To begin, one issue for hybrid accounts of slurs are that they heavily rely on 
neutral counterparts of slurs existing to explain how a slur’s meaning is constructed. 
First, there is, as Geoffrey Nunberg points out, no such thing as truly neutral language 
                                                
19 Camp, p. 50. 
20 Ibid., p. 31, 30, 50.   
21 Ibid., p. 47-48. 
22 Ibid., p. 37, 56. 
23 Bach, p. 63. 
24 Ibid., p. 60. 
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to begin with, but rather only “default” language that is commonly accepted as 
demanding the least controversial commitment by the speaker when spoken. If there 
had been such a thing as fully neutral language, Nunberg argues, there would not exist 
any incentive to replace previous terms.25 In his view, the difference between a slur 
and its so-called neutral counterpart is not that the former has certain negative 
connotations and the latter has none, but that the latter has different, less contested, 
connotations than the former.26 There is nothing to say that the words we today 
consider to be neutral in comparison to slurs will not have their current status of 
‘neutrality’ challenged in the future, like how the now archaic ‘handicapped’ has been 
replaced by ‘disabled’. 
Now, is presupposing the existence of neutral counterparts completely 
detrimental to hybrid expressivist accounts? Probably not. But it is theoretically 
cumbersome, as the theorising would have to include reservations about the idea of 
neutrality in language, and for how one kind of word’s extension entails exactly the 
extension of another word without them being synonymous. It would to have to 
include some rather graceless and vague ideas of other words-that-single-out-the-
same-set-of-individual-humans that could be avoided by not presupposing the 
existence of neutral counterparts at all. It would also need to be an explanation of 
neutrality that is not rooted in the actual use of words, since the reasoning behind a 
semantic account is the sentiment that a pragmatic account is not enough to explain 
how slurs function in language.  
Additionally, the positing that the offensiveness of a slur derives from what sets 
it apart from a non-offensive co-referent can easily become circular. For if what sets 
offensiveness apart is its non-neutrality, and what sets neutrality apart is its non-
offensiveness, then how can we define either without it resulting in circular reasoning 
in a semantic account? Granted, the demand for a neutral counterpart may not be 
essential to hybrid accounts, it may be that it is simply a convenient method of 
explanation that may be reduced or modified to not posit the existence of neutral 
counterparts at all. As of what I have been able to find, this is not currently the case 
however. 
Furthermore, in the hybrid accounts’ positing that the slur’s extension set is 
identical to the set of individuals in the extension of the neutral counterpart, it seems 
                                                
25 Nunberg, p. 274–275, 273. 
26 Ibid., p. 273-274. 
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that part of the slur’s extensionality is misrepresented: a slur seems to be able to be 
successfully applied to a wider set of individuals than the neutral counterpart. If we 
consider the following example (the phrase yet again borrowed from Camp):  
 
6: “If they promote another bitch out of this damn job before me, I’m 
going to sue for discrimination.” 
 
Here, the speaker uses ‘bitch’ as extensionally equivalent to ‘woman’. But utterances 
containing ‘bitch’ may also be directed towards individuals outside the set of women, 
such as in:  
 
7: “Man up, don’t be such a bitch.” 
 
Here being successfully directed at a male individual without causing anyone to be 
confused or believing that the speaker has misinterpreted the target’s gender identity. 
Admittedly, one could argue that the slur is offensive in different ways, when applied 
to a female individual it might be offensive because it creates the idea that the target 
is somehow ‘bad’ or ‘lesser’ because she is a woman, and when applied to a male 
target the offensive effects arise from the man being so bad that he resembles a 
woman (or instantiates feminine ‘lesser’ qualities or the like). My point here is that 
the target of a slurring utterance need not necessarily be in the set contained in the 
slur’s neutral counterpart in order to be successfully applied. There seems, therefore, 
to be a lesser ‘demand’ upon the extensionality of a slur compared to what 
semanticists call the word’s neutral counterpart. Granted, ‘woman’ or ‘girl’ may be 
similarly used to ‘bitch’ in (7) to insult a non-woman, but I find it hard to see how a 
word like ‘Jew’ might as readily be successfully be applied to a non-Jewish person as 
its slur counterpart, ‘kike’, which might more conceivably be used to successfully 
insult a non-Jewish person. 
Furthermore, most hybrid expressivist accounts run into trouble when trying to 
explain how a slur can be offensive when uttered by one speaker, but not at all when 
uttered by another, such as the example of ‘nigga’ when spoken by a member of 
certain African American communities mentioned in section 1.2.27 This because most 
postulate that any and all uses of slurs are offensive in any given context, as the 
                                                
27 There are many within African American communities that do not agree that the term can be used in 
anything but a slurring way, as Luvell Anderson points out. Anderson, p. 8. 
   
 
 13 
offensive effect-causing element is to be find in the words semantic meaning. Camp 
does not discuss this problem in her article, but I can imagine that this is an instance 
where her idea that either part of the slur’s meaning could be primary in a given 
situation might be used to answer this criticism. 28 In her account, in the case of an in-
group speaker of a slur, the primary meaning of the slur would then be the neutral-
counterpart-equivalent one. This solution might save Camp’s hybrid account from this 
issue, but it does not free other hybrid accounts like Jeshion’s or Bach’s, since they 
are adamant that the offensive effects of a slur are part of its semantic meaning at all 
times. 
A similar problem also arises for the hybrid accounts of slur meaning in that 
slurs seem to be able to change meaning over time. This I slightly touched upon in the 
paragraph about neutrality, but it deserves its own explanation of how it poses a 
problem for the hybrid semantic accounts. Above I used the word ‘nigga’ to illustrate 
the problem of in-group versus out-group speaker, but we can also use it to illustrate 
the reappropriation of a slur word by the targeted group. In the process of being 
reclaimed, the word seems to get a new semantic meaning, if we are to suppose that 
the hybrid view of slurs is correct. There is no case of one part being primary or 
secondary, it seems that these reclaimed words completely loose any and all elements 
of antagonistic meaning; they, in this use, cease to be slurs. A clearer example is that 
of ‘queer’, formerly a slur but today more extensively used to denote a general 
LGBTQ+ identity, to the point where universities offer courses and degrees in Queer 
studies. The fact that slurs can simply cease to be slurs depending on use is damaging 
to hybrid semantic accounts of slur meaning especially since it seems that these words 
seem to be able to change semantic meaning depending on use. Normally, a word’s 
truth-conditional meaning remains fairly stable over time; it is hard to see how words 
like ‘arm’ or ‘Chinese’ would be able to change meaning over the course of a hundred, 
or even a few hundred, years. But it seems that slurs especially are prone to come in 
or out of being slurs fairly quickly. Postulating an additional part of semantic meaning 
therefore seems to come at the cost of granting fairly rapid changes in semantic 
meaning as opposed to the more traditional truth-conditional view of semantic 
meaning. This is a problem that the other accounts of slurs’ meaning do not share. 
 
                                                
28 Camp, p. 37, 56. 
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2.3 The linguistic competence approach 
Yet another kind of semantic approach suggests that one way of interpreting a words 
meaning is that included in a word’s meaning is what needs to be understood in order 
to competently use the word. There are two different approaches in this category that I 
want to address, one is Justina Diaz-Legaspe’s idea that there are facts about words, 
such as register, that need to be known in order to fully understand them.29 The other 
is Mark Richard’s more vague idea that there simply are some facts about words that 
need to be known in order to use them competently.30 
Starting with the more fleshed out theory, Diaz-Legaspe envisages slurs as a 
distinct word class, differentiated from other words by what she calls a “[+ 
derogatory]” register.31 Register is in her view is a ‘metadata’ fact about the slur word 
that is not exactly part of its semantic content but not being aware of a word’s register 
signals “linguistic incompetence”.32 It is interesting that she has chosen to use the 
term metadata, which both Geoffrey Nunberg and Geoffrey Pullum categorize as 
belonging to the realm of pragmatics.33 That aside, Diaz-Legaspe’s allows for slurs to 
be a more fluid category of words than the hybrid expressivist accounts above, as she 
bases her assignment of the [+ derogatory] register in social factors, which allows for 
a word to move in and out of the slur category depending on how it is used.34 
Although Diaz-Legaspe distances herself from hybrid expressivism by saying 
that she in no way means that register affects truth-conditional values or have “the 
ability to convey an extra content above their truth-conditional content or to express 
emotions or attitudes”, her account may be compared to other hybrid accounts like 
Bach’s above.35 This because she includes her notion of register in a category of 
meaning that is broader than strictly truth-conditional semantics, but that does not 
overlap with use, i.e. register should according to her not be considered a pragmatic 
feature of word meaning.36 Thus she seems to be advocating for, if seen through the 
lens of a classic semantic-pragmatic division, some form of additional semantic 
                                                
29 Diaz-Legaspe, p. 13f. 
30 Mark Richard, “How do Slurs Mean?”, Bad Words. Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, ed. David 
Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 159. 
31 Diaz-Legaspe p. 13, 15. 
32 Ibid., p. 13f.  
33 Nunberg, p. 265; Pullum, p. 170. 
34 Diaz-Legaspe p. 15. 
35 Ibid., p. 14, [footnote 22]. 
36 Ibid., p. 13, [footnote 5]. 
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component outside the truth-conditional one. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the 
fact of register could not affect truth-value in examples like:  
 
8: “’Kike’ is a derogatory word.” 
 
This statement would be true according to Diaz-Legaspe’s theory since ‘kike’ would 
have the [+ derogatory] feature, while the statement 
 
9: “’Jew’ is a derogatory word.” 
 
Would still be false, since it lacks the [+ derogatory] register. Thus, it seems that 
register does affect truth-conditionality when it comes to separating slurs from more 
neutral words that denote the same set of individuals.  
Similarly to Diaz-Legaspe, Mark Richard suggests a definition of meaning that 
apart from the truth-conditions of a word also has demands of “what a speaker has to 
be in cognitive contact with in order to qualify as competent” in order to fully grasp 
the word’s meaning.37 Thus Richard, in a sense, rejects the classical distinction 
between semantic and pragmatic meaning in favour of another, linguistic competence-
based, concept of meaning. This includes that the word is most commonly used in a 
derogatory manner, that, as Richard puts it, “their central linguistic use […] is one 
that makes prejudice and disrespect manifest”.38 On this point Richard’s account is 
comparable to Diaz-Legaspe’s account, demanding that in order to comprehend a 
word, the speaker needs to be aware of certain facts about its use. 
What I find most interesting in Richard’s account however, is that he sketches a 
cognitively based process of understanding language in response to the in-/-out-group 
problem. He discusses a process of understanding language via unconscious processes 
based upon the facts known about the word’s most common usage.39 What he says is 
that initially, when a slur is uttered, the hearer is automatically and sub-consciously 
alerted to respond as if something offensive has been uttered, even though it may not 
be meant in an offensive way. The hearer may even realise this quite immediately, but 
the offensive effects of the slur are still triggered, as the offensive use of the slur is the 
most common one (in Richard’s example, the hearer interprets an utterance in which a 
                                                
37 Richard, p. 159. 
38 Ibid., p. 158-159. 
39 Ibid., p. 166f. 
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Jewish person refers to themselves as a ‘kike’).40 This thought of a cognitively based 
interpretation process of slurs is what I find to be one of the more interesting parts of 
Richard’s account, and it is something I shall return to. 
Another theoretic virtue that accounts like Diaz-Legaspe’s and Richard’s both 
share is that they avoid the trouble of presupposing the existence of neutral 
counterparts or additional parts of semantic meaning, which we saw above causes 
some trouble for the hybrid views. Thus the linguistic competence accounts do not 
fall victim to the in-group/out-group problem in the same way as the hybrid views do. 
Even though I find the idea of linguistic competence to be central to the idea of 
meaning, I do wonder what exactly it is that merits that these facts that need to be 
known about a word cannot be included in pragmatic meaning. I find that neither 
Diaz-Legaspe nor Richard provides justification for why the notion of linguistic 
competence meaning cannot be included pragmatic meaning, as it seems to be based 
upon facts about how words are used. After all, the facts necessary for understanding 
language and being a competent speaker are on both accounts facts about how words 
are used or interpreted in a given situation. Thus, it seems to me that this idea of 
linguistic competence meaning is essentially a pragmatic notion. Perhaps what is 
needed in order to account for how we are to understand the meaning of slurs is not to 
inflate our notion of semantic meaning, but rather to reconsider what we commonly 
mean by pragmatic meaning? 
 
2.4 General problems with the semantic accounts 
In this section, I will briefly discuss what I believe to be the major problem facing all 
semantic theories of slurs’ meaning, which is that they go against the classical 
philosophical distinction between semantics and pragmatics.  
The main reason why I consider inflating the notion of semantic meaning in 
order to explain the meaning and function of slurs in language is the following: if we 
accept that there are aspects of slurs that merit expanding our idea of semantic 
meaning, what is there to say that the semantic meaning may not be expanded for 
other kinds of words as well? If we accept that there is no such thing as fully neutral 
language as I mentioned above, then we also have to accept that our so-called neutral 
terms that refer to groups of humans also contain these additional semantic contents. 
                                                
40 Richard, p. 166. 
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In this case, the ‘neutral’ counterparts must also contain the presuppositions or 
attitudes of the speaker or else some form of additional data denoting that the use of 
this word is at present time and societal context mostly uncontroversial. Thus, 
semantics will not have to be expanded for slurs only, but also for all other group-
designating terms. And there is nothing to say that the inflation of semantic meaning 
may stop only at group-designating terms. In this way, semantic theories about slur 
meaning may potentially undermine the usefulness of distinguishing between 
semantic and pragmatic meaning in the first place. 
This is not to say that the traditional division of truth-conditional semantics and 
‘everything else’-pragmatics is in some way a more accurate way of describing how a 
language functions. It may be, as Camp suggests, simply a methodologically useful 
tool for structuring our ideas of meaning in language.41 I do not agree with Camp, 
however, that this merits expanding the traditional idea of semantics, since it would 
then undermine the distinction’s original function of distinguishing between truth-
conditional meaning as opposed to other forms of meaning in language. 
 
 
3. Pragmatic accounts of slurs 
 
Having examined the semantic accounts, we now move on to those who believe slurs 
are offensive solely on account of pragmatic factors. From what I have been able to 
find, these purely pragmatic accounts are fewer in number than the hybrid or other 
semantic accounts. Commonly they emphasise slurs’ total semantic neutrality, which 
they argue is turned into a slur through how speakers use the word. An extremely 
simplified way of explaining it may be that there is not really such a thing as a slur on 
pragmatic accounts, only slurring uses of words. Here, I shall present two recent 
pragmatic accounts of slurs: Geoffrey Nunberg’s “ventriloquistic” account as well as 
Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone’s idea of contextually interpreted “pejorative 
tone”.42 After this I shall present some general problems for both of these pragmatic 
explanations of the meaning of slurs. 
 
                                                
41 Camp, p. 48. 
42 Nunberg, p. 266ff; Ernie Lepore & Matthew Stone, ”Pejorative Tone”, Bad Words. Philosophical 
Perspectives on Slurs, ed. David Sosa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 132-154. 
   
 
 18 
3.1 Slurs as signalling social group membership of speaker 
Geoffrey Nunberg offers a staunchly pragmatic account of slurs’ offensiveness. 
Nunberg considers a slur to be a fundamentally neutral descriptive term that ‘belongs’ 
to the group that coined it. He makes the example of ‘redskin’ as belonging more to 
the white descendants of colonists rather than members of the group of Native 
Americans that the slur targets.43 A slur is therefore, in Nunberg’s eyes, a marker of 
the speaker’s belonging to a certain social group rather than anything else. According 
to Nunberg, using a slur is a breach of the Gricean Maxim of Manner by using a word 
that belongs to another social group context than is what considered appropriate, and 
an act in which the speaker primarily aims to affiliate themselves with the group of 
people that in his words ‘own’ the slur, or as a way of showing in-group camaraderie 
by making fun of social groupings outside the own.44 He uses the term ventriloquism 
or “ventriloquistic implicature” to denote this way of using a certain social group’s 
words in the ‘wrong’ context. But, in his account, these are elements of metadata 
about slurs’ meaning. And in his view, conversely to Diaz-Legaspe above, these 
metadata exclusively belong to pragmatic meaning.45 In his account, there is nothing 
other than these pragmatic metadata that separates the meaning of a slur from the 
meaning of its so-called neutral counterpart. 
Personally, I find the group-affiliating-by-the-speaker element that Nunberg so 
strongly highlights to be an important part of what slurs can be said to do. However, I 
would argue that his account falters in that he disregards uses of slurs that are 
explicitly meant to target other individuals and to shame, belittle, or otherwise hurt 
others that we already in section 1.2 established as one of the more important parts of 
slurs’ function in language. He does attempt to acknowledge slurs’ offensive and 
harmful effects by saying that the speaker does bear responsibility for the words they 
use, but it falls short against his insistence that a slur’s primary function is in 
signalling the speaker’s social group membership or as in-group banter about 
members of the out-group.46 
 
 
                                                
43 Nunberg, p. 289-290. 
44 Nunberg phrases it as follows: “the main reason why people coin slurs is to provide pleasure and 
gratification for their friends rather than to visit humiliation upon their targets”. Nunberg, p. 256. 
45 Ibid., p. 265, 272.  
46 Ibid., p. 287; p. 256. 
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3.2 Slurs’ offensive effects as examples of pejorative tone 
Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone argue that the only common denominator between 
the words populating the set of slurs is that they are “prohibited”.47 In the article, they 
argue that slurs are ‘tabooed’ words, offensive on account of some relevant authority 
deeming them to be so – there does not necessarily need to be a cause, on their view, 
for the word to be prohibited or tabooed in this way.48 Lepore and Stone argue that the 
offensiveness of a slur is to be interpreted in each individual situation it occurs, on 
account of the situation meriting the interpretation of what they call pejorative tone. 
Thereby making their account of slurs’ offensiveness a pragmatic one. The notion of 
tone dates back to Frege, who considers tone to be the difference between using “cur” 
and “dog” to refer to the same animal. In Frege’s example, these words denote the 
same object or concept; they only do so in different ways.49 Lepore and Stone argue 
that slurs operate in a similar way, that words like ‘Jew’ and ‘kike’ are simply 
different sinn for the same bedeutung: they evoke “different associations” that on 
their view “need not be due to differences in meaning”.50 Instead, they argue that 
there is something more indefinable, like a collection of vague associations that are 
outside Lepore and Stone’s definition of meaning.5152 On their account, the difference 
between ‘Jew’ and ‘kike’ is akin to that of “blossom” and “bloom” – that these words 
are synonyms evoking different vague connotations but that they are, ultimately, 
synonyms.53 They also insist on the weight of the individual “interpretative reasoning” 
in deeming an utterance to instantiate a case of the pejorative tone they describe, that 
is, they deem that it is in each individual tokening of a slur up to the recipient or 
person taking offense to decide whether or not the utterance has a pejorative tone.54 
This I also find disregards the idea brought up by the linguistic competence approach, 
and by Nunberg to an extent in insisting the speaker has moral responsibility of word 
choice, that the offensiveness of a slur is a fact about the word that a competent 
                                                
47 Lepore & Stone, p. 134f. 
48 Ibid., p. 137. 
49 Ibid., p. 133. 
50 Ibid., p. 133. 
51 Ibid., p. 138. 
52 In the article, Lepore and Stone do not explicitly refer to their idea of tone as a pragmatic notion. 
Nevertheless, I take that what they are aiming to describe when they simply say meaning is the truth-
conditional semantic meaning of a word, whereas I interpret tone, due to its dependence upon 
contextual factors, to be an element of pragmatic meaning. 
53 Lepore & Stone, p.140. Additionally, Lepore and Stone do not actually use or make mention of any 
actual slur words in their examples, preferring instead to use ”blossom” and ”bloom” as their examples 
of synonyms of tonal difference throughout. 
54 Ibid., p. 138. 
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speaker should know prior to making competent use of it. 55  By leaving the 
interpretation of offensive effects to the speaker, Lepore and Stone thus disregard that 
slurs are commonly known among speakers to cause offensive effects, and they also 
thereby in a way frees the speaker of a slur from responsibility for causing these 
effects. 
What I find to be lacking in Lepore and Stone’s account is similar to what I find 
to be lacking in Nunberg’s account: they seem to be disregarding how big of a part of 
a slur’s function in language their offensive effects seem to be. The offensive effects 
are evidently, as we’ve seen above, inescapable parts of slur meaning to the degree 
that many believe that it merits including the offensiveness in a slur’s semantic 
meaning. They equate the offense an individual takes at being called a slur is akin to 
the offense an individual takes at being called a nickname that they dislike.56 This I 
find to be ignoring the idea that a slur is different from a personal insult in that they 
are offensive, derogative, and insulting to the individual it is directed at and the whole 
group of individuals that it denotes simultaneously.  
 
3.3 General problems with the pragmatic point of view 
Having presented some issues that the pragmatic accounts above face individually, in 
this section, I shall present some of the more general problems they face. To begin, 
one idea that lies at the heart of many of the arguments we have seen from the 
opposing semantic point of view is the idea of non-synonymy between slurs and their 
neutral counterparts. To illustrate this I will again use examples borrowed from Camp, 
one of which I have referenced to above as well: 
 




10: “Am I racist if I believe that Chinese people are chinks?” 
 
In these examples, we can see that there is in fact, as Camp argues, a difference 
between the slur and the so-called neutral counterpart, since if we were to accept them 
                                                
55 Nunberg, p. 287. 
56 Lepore & Stone, p. 137. 
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as synonyms, the above utterances would not make any sense, as evidenced by the 
following phrases: 
 
3R: “Institutions that treat Chinese as Chinese are racist”57 
10R: “Am I racist if I believe that Chinese people are Chinese?” 
 
I can see a possible way out of this for Nunberg by appealing to his idea that slurs are 
primarily a way for the speaker to associate themselves with certain slur-using social 
groups. However, as I have already argued above, I find this idea to be unable to 
capture the ability of slurs to cause offensive effects even in mention, and thus this 
would still be a weak defence. Additionally, as Lepore and Stone consider slurs and 
their so-called neutral counterparts to be synonymous, I fail to see how they would 
make sense of the apparent sense that (3) and (10) make compared to (3R) and (10R).  
It seems to me as if semantic accounts are too inflationary to be theoretically 
valuable ways of approaching the meaning of slurs, these pragmatic accounts are too 
deflationary in that they seem to disregard too much of the things that the utterance of 





At this point, I have presented and reviewed both semantic and pragmatic accounts of 
the meaning of slurs, and found virtues and faults on both sides of the divide. In this 
section I aim to reiterate these in order to present my idea that a more effective way of 
theorising about the meaning of slurs would be in a pragmatic account of slurs where 
pragmatic elements of meaning and interpretation are equally or even more highly 
valued than semantic meaning. 
What I find virtuous about the sematic accounts I have mentioned in general is 
that they take seriously that slurs carry with them a harmful element, and that they in 
more situations than not are highly insulting, contemptuous, derogatory, and offensive. 
As we have seen, they respect that there seems to be a significant distinction between 
utterances of “Jew” and “kike” that they believe is done disrespect to by reducing 
                                                
57 Camp, p. 33, 43. Phrases (3), (10), and (3R) taken directly from Camp, (10R) modified according to 
Camp’s example in (3R). 
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slurs’ meaning to a mere extensional synonym of a neutral counterpart, which is 
exactly what the pragmatic accounts reviewed argue. As we have also seen, it is easy 
to see how one would reject “kike” as a synonym to “Jew” on account of its offensive 
and derogatory element. They also seem to respect a natural way of reasoning about 
etymology: since these words were coined and originally used by groups of people 
that were actively oppressive and/or hateful toward the target group, this must be a 
part of its meaning.58 A slur is then consequently offensive and insulting partly 
because it, in different ways according to the different semantic accounts presented 
above, represents the point of view of its original users. However, we also saw that 
there are words which meanings simply cannot be explained by a semantic account 
because of this static view of slurs’ meaning, such as ‘queer’. 
Furthermore, I would again argue that if we are to retain the methodological 
benefits of the semantic-pragmatic distinction that warranted its creation, it is not 
theoretically sound to inflate the notion of semantic meaning to include more than 
semantic meaning.  
Yet the pragmatic theories of slur meaning that I have presented do not seem to 
be able to account adequately for slurs’ offensive effects. So whereas the semantic 
accounts are theoretically cumbersome, the pragmatic accounts seem to be unable to 
explain why slurs are able to cause the offensive effects they do to the point where it 
is difficult to see how these accounts merit classifying slurs as a category of words 
separate from other group-designating terms. 
What I suggest is therefore a re-evaluation of semantic versus pragmatic 
meaning. I believe that the offensive effects that slurs cause are very much part of 
their primary function in language, and that, much like those arguing for a linguistic 
competence approach propose, this is a fact about slurs that any competent speaker 
needs to have knowledge of in order to truly understand the word. But I also believe 
that this does not merit inflating our idea of semantic meaning. I suggest that we 
instead view some pragmatic facts like these about how slurs are commonly used to 
be essential to the understanding of their meaning. 
In this view, many of the problems faced by the semantic accounts other than 
theoretic inelegance could possibly be be avoided as well. The in-group/out-group 
problem would then for example be trivial, as a slur uttered by an in-group speaker 
                                                
58 See for example Diaz-Legaspe, p. 15f. 
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would then in most contexts not be interpreted as hostile, and the semantic meaning of 
the word would not have to be changed because of the speaker belonging to the group 
traditionally targeted by hostile uses of the slur.  
Overall, the idea of slurs’ pragmatic meaning is close to that suggested by the 
proponents of the linguistic competence approach, only that what they claim to be 
non-pragmatic aspects of slur meaning are in fact pragmatic, and that this does not 
make them less primary to the meaning of a slur. It would seem rather, that in the case 
of slurs, it is then their pragmatic meaning that is most often primary as opposed to 
their semantic meaning. 
In additional support to this I wish to return also to Richard’s idea of an 
immediate interpretative process taking place in the hearer at the utterance of a slur. 
As mentioned in the section on the linguistic competence approach, he is of the 
opinion that the immediateness of this interpretive process warrants an expansion of 
semantic meaning, rather than calling it a pragmatic process. However, I see no 
reason as to why we could not see this interpretative process as pragmatic, since it is 
ultimately based upon knowledge of previous uses of the word. 
There is not enough space to fully develop an argument supporting a re-
evaluation of pragmatics as opposed to semantics, and I do not aim to imply that I do 
anything of the sort. What I wish to suggest at most in this essay is that perhaps we 
can gather, from investigating the semantic-pragmatic distinction as it figures in 
recent debate about the meaning of slurs, is that there may be cause to further 
investigate a re-evaluation of pragmatic meaning in language to be more primary than 
semantic meaning. This because there does seem to be many aspects of slur meaning 
that appear to be inescapably part of how we interpret and react to utterances of slurs 










After a review of some recent accounts of slurs’ place in language and meaning, I 
have come to conclude that both sides are lacking in some aspects. We have seen that 
semantic accounts generally inflate the notion of semantic meaning without gaining a 
proportional advantage, but also that extant pragmatic accounts do not seem to want 
to take slurs’ offensive effects to be part of their meaning except for in very local 
contexts. I have therefore proposed a sort of middle ground between the two sides of 
the argument I have reviewed: that we see slurs’ offensive effects as belonging to 
pragmatics, but not in such a way that we are undervaluing these effects. On the 
contrary, when it comes to slurs, I have suggested that it might be that elements of 
their pragmatic meaning is the one that matters most in most situations when it comes 
to slurs, as many take slurs’ offensive effects to be their raison d’être. 
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